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Evidence
by Marc T. Treadwell
I.

INTRODUCTION

The survey period saw a number of cases raising significant evidentiary issues. Most notable is the continuing evolution of the necessity
exception to the rule against hearsay. During the survey period, the
Supreme Court added a third prong to the test for the admission of
evidence pursuant to the necessity exception, and thus seemingly
narrowed the scope of the exception. However, the court also expanded
the circumstances that constitute the "unavailability" of a witness. The
net effect seems to be an expansion of the necessity exception.
II.

OBJECTIONS

With the possible exception of the harmless error doctrine, the most
effective weapon in an appellate court's arsenal to repel an appeal is the
contemporaneous objection rule, which requires lawyers to object timely
and properly to an evidentiary ruling. When an appellate court acidly
notes that the "record resounds with the silence caused by the absence
of an objection to this testimony,"1 the mind pictures a lawyer dozing
placidly at counsel's table. Yet all lawyers can sympathize with those
who find themselves the subject of a pronouncement, made in the calm
and ordered world of appellate proceedings, that they failed to object
timely or properly in the heat of a trial court battle.
There is still one exception to the contemporaneous objection rule, an
exception that seemed on the verge of demise, but which has stubbornly
held on. The Georgia courts have long held that hearsay evidence, even
if not objected to, is wholly without probative value and thus cannot
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1. Bridgers v. State, 183 Ga. App. 98, 99, 357 S.E.2d 894, 895 (1987).
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2 a
support a verdict. In Sharpe v. Department of Transportation,
decision discussed in a previous survey,' the supreme court expanded
the contemporaneous objection rule and barred the use of a subsequent
motion to strike to attack "illegal evidence."4 It seemed implicit in the
holding that the court also would reject the principle that hearsay, even
though not objected to, has no probative value. However, the supreme
court has yet to formally renounce this principle. Thus, in Day v.
State,5 the court of appeals reversed a conviction that was based on
hearsay evidence even though defendant did not object to the introduction of this evidence.6 Noting that "[w]e are not at liberty to overrule
the established line of authority for this rule, to which the Supreme
Court of Georgia adheres,"7 the court of appeals conceded that hearsay
evidence is without probative value and "'its introduction without
objection does not give it any weight or force whatever in establishing a
fact.'" 8
Although motions in limine are valuable tools to resolve evidentiary
issues prior to trial, lawyers must ensure that they preserve for appeal
the issues raised by the motion. While it is true, as discussed in a
previous survey,9 that the court of appeals has held that "where the
trial court's ruling on a motion in limine is violated, further objection at
trial is unnecessary to preserve the matter for appellate review," the
mere filing of a motion does not preserve an issue for appeal.' In Orr
v. CSX Transportation, Inc.," plaintiff moved in limine to exclude
portions of the testimony of defendant's expert that would be presented
by deposition at trial. However, the trial court did not, at least on the
record, rule on the motion. When defendant presented the deposition
testimony at trial, plaintiff did not object. 2 The court of appeals held
that under these circumstances the plaintiff waived any objection to the
testimony."3

2. 267 Ga. 267, 476 S.E.2d 722 (1996).
3. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 49 MERCER L. REV. 149, 149-51 (1997).
4. 267 Ga. at 267, 476 S.E.2d at 723.
5. 235 Ga. App. 771, 510 S.E.2d 579 (1998).
6. Id. at 772-73, 510 S.E.2d at 580.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 772, 510 S.E.2d at 580 (citing White Missionary Baptist Church v. Trustees
of First Baptist, 268 Ga. 668, 669, 492 S.E.2d 661, (1997)).
9. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 47 MERCER L. REV. 127 (1995).
10. General Motors Corp. v. Moseley, 213 Ga. App. 875, 877, 447 S.E.2d 302, 306
(1994).
11. 233 Ga. App. 530, 505 S.E.2d 45 (1994).
12. Id. at 531-32, 505 S.E.2d at 47.
13. Id.
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In Johnson v. State, 4 defendant contended on appeal that evidence
of a conviction offered for impeachment purposes was inadmissible
because the prosecution failed to prove that he was the defendant
identified in the conviction. However, at trial defendant's counsel
objected to the tender of the conviction only on the grounds that the
prosecution had not laid a proper foundation for the admission of the
conviction. 5 The court of appeals held this was insufficient, stating
"[i]t has long been the law that '[o]bjection on the ground of a lack of
proper foundation without stating what the properfoundation should be
is insufficient and presents nothing for considerationon appeal.'"16 The
apparent harshness of this ruling is demonstrated by Judge Andrews'
dissent in which he vigorously argued that "any fair construction of the
record" revealed that defendant objected to the conviction on the grounds
that the prosecution had not sufficiently established that he was the
defendant in the conviction.' 7
III.

RELEVANCY

Relevancy of ExtrinsicAct Evidence
In the twelve years the author has surveyed Georgia appellate
decisions, the determination of the relevancy of extrinsic act evidence
has been the most frequently addressed evidentiary issue. During the
current survey period, Georgia courts rendered several notable extrinsic
act evidence decisions.
In past years, the 'supreme court has often grappled with the issue of
whether evidence of prior difficulties between a defendant and his victim
falls within the scope of Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3, which
requires the prosecution to provide a defendant with notice of its intent
to tender extrinsic evidence and to the trial court in order to convene a
hearing to establish whether the prosecution can prove the elements
necessary to the admission of extrinsic act evidence.' 8
In Maxwell v. State, 9 the supreme court held that prior difficulties
evidence constituted extrinsic act evidence for the purposes of Rule

A.

14. 233 Ga. App. 301, 504 S.E.2d 8 (1998).
15. Id. at 302, 504 S.E.2d at 10.
16. Id. at 302-03, 504 S.E.2d at 10 (quoting Gordon v. State, 206 Ga. App. 450, 455, 425
S.E.2d 906, 911 (1992)) (second alteration by court) (emphasis added by court) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
17. Id. at 307, 504 S.E.2d at 13 (Andrews, C.J., dissenting).
18. UNIF. SUP. CT. R. 31.3.
19. 262 Ga. 73, 414 S.E.2d 470 (1992).
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31.3.20 However, as reported in last year's survey," the supreme
court overruled Maxwell in Wall v. State.22 The court reasoned that a
Rule 31.3 hearing would be superfluous.23 At a Rule 31.3 hearing, the
prosecution is required to make a so-called Williams showing, a test
based on the supreme court's decision in Williams v. State.24 First, the
prosecution must prove the relevance of the extrinsic act evidence to a
legitimate issue.25 Second, the prosecution must prove that the
defendant committed the independent offense or act.26 Last, the
prosecution must prove a sufficient connection or similarity between the
prior act or offense and the charged offense.
The court in Wall
reasoned that in the case of evidence of difficulties between a victim and
a defendant, the Williams showing is necessarily satisfied.2"
During the current survey period, the supreme court addressed the
opposite situation. In Owens v. State,29 defendant contended that the
trial court erred when it excluded evidence of prior difficulties between
her and the victim, her husband. Defendant wanted to show that her
husband became violent when he drank and would wave his gun at her.
The trial court refused to admit this evidence because defendant had not
met the requirements of Rules 31.1 and 31.6, which impose on a
defendant requirements for the admission of extrinsic act evidence. 30
Noting that the State no longer had to comply with the similar
requirements of Rules 31.1 and 31.3, the supreme court found there was
3
now "'an imbalance of forces between the accused and his accuser.'" '
Accordingly, the court reversed defendant's conviction
and held that the
2
trial court erred when it excluded the evidence.
Defendants often seek to block the admission of extrinsic act evidence
by arguing that the issues for which the evidence is being offered are not
in dispute; thus, there is no need for the evidence. For example, in
Livery v. State3 defendant contended that because he only asserted an

20. Id. at 74-75, 414 S.E.2d at 472-73.
21. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 50 MERCER L. REV. 229, 234 (1998).
22. 269 Ga. 506, 509, 500 S.E.2d 904, 907, (1998).
23. Id. at 508-09, 500 S.E.2d at 906-07.
24. 261 Ga. 640, 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991).
25. Id. at 642, 409 S.E.2d at 651.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 269 Ga. at 509, 500 S.E.2d at 907.
29. 270 Ga. 199, 509 S.E.2d 905 (1998).
30. Id. at 201, 509 S.E.2d at 907.
31. Id. at 201-02, 509 S.E.2d at 908 (quoting Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474
(1973)).
32. Id. at 202, 509 S.E.2d at 908.
33. 233 Ga. App. 332, 503 S.E.2d 914 (1998).
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alibi defense, the prosecution should not have been allowed to introduce
extrinsic act evidence that was relevant to other issues.34 The court of
appeals disagreed: "The similar transaction evidence in this case
provided proof of the State's prima facie case of attempted child
molestation. The fact that [defendant] presented only an alibi defense
does35not make this evidence inadmissible for other permissible purposes."
Although the courts liberally admit extrinsic act evidence in criminal
cases, there are some bounds. In 7yson v. State,36 the court held that
the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of a similar transaction
that occurred twenty-seven years before the charged offense. 37 The
court deemed this period of time simply too remote to be admissible.38
Although the prosecution must prove that a defendant committed a
similar transaction, it need not prove this beyond a reasonable doubt.
Thus, in Grant v. State, 9 the court held that a trial court properly
admitted evidence of a similar transaction even though defendant's
conviction for that offense had been reversed on appeal.4" The court
also noted that the conviction for the similar transaction had been
reversed on a very narrow ground, and thus the reversal did not
establish that defendant did not commit a similar transaction.4 1
The scope of admissible extrinsic act evidence is generally narrower in
civil cases than in criminal cases. At first glance this may seem odd;
surely courts should be more reluctant to admit highly prejudicial
extrinsic act evidence in criminal cases, in which freedom and occasionally life are at stake, than in civil cases. However, there is a logical
basis for this disparate treatment. Civil cases rarely involve issues of
intent, motive, scheme, or other issues that are in play in cases involving
criminal misconduct. Rather, civil cases typically involve unintentional
conduct, such as negligence. As reported in last year's survey,42 this
reasoning seemed to guide the court of appeals in Dawson v. FultonDeKalb Hospital Authority."
In Dawson plaintiff contended that defendant's malpractice caused the
death of her ten-year-old son. After a jury returned a small verdict in

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 334, 503 S.E.2d at 916.
Id.
232 Ga. App. 732, 503 S.E.2d 640 (1998).
Id. at 733, 503 S.E.2d at 641.
Id.
237 Ga. App. 892, 515 S.E.2d 872 (1999).
Id. at 894, 515 S.E.2d at 874.
Id. at 895, 515 S.E.2d at 875.
Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 50 MERCER L. REv. 229, 237 (1998).
227 Ga. App. 715, 490 S.E.2d 142 (1997), rev'd, 270 Ga. 376, 509 S.E.2d 28 (1998).
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her favor, plaintiff appealed, contending among other things that the
trial court erroneously admitted evidence that she failed to bring her
child to four scheduled appointments prior to the surgery-allegedly
causing her son's death. She argued that her failure to keep these
appointments was not relevant to the issue of whether defendant's
subsequent conduct caused her son's death.44 The court of appeals
agreed: "'As a general rule, in negligence actions, evidence of similar
acts or omissions is not admissible."'4 5 While it could be argued that
evidence of a plaintiff's "habit" of negligently caring for her son would be
admissible to prove that she subsequently was negligent in her care of
the son, the evidence was not sufficient to establish a fixed and uniform
habit. 46 Thus, the court of appeals held that the trial court erred in
admitting the evidence.47
During the current survey period, the supreme court granted certiorari
and reached a contrary conclusion. 4' The court agreed that evidence
of similar acts is generally inadmissible in negligence cases.49 However, the supreme court disagreed that evidence of the missed appointments constituted extrinsic act evidence.5" "Instead, the evidence
illustrated plaintiff's conduct with regard to the same transaction, the
continuing health care of the child."5 This would seem to be a very
expansive reading of what constitutes the transaction at issue.
B.

Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures

In Department of Transportationv. Cannady,52 plaintiff claimed that
the DOT's negligent maintenance of a highway caused the automobile
in which she was a passenger to hydroplane. At trial plaintiff successfully tendered evidence that the highway's original 1931 design and
construction had been changed for cost reasons when the road was
resurfaced in 1989. Three weeks after plaintiff was injured, the DOT
restored the highway to its original design. On appeal, the DOT argued
that this evidence constituted evidence of subsequent remedial measures
and should not have been admitted because it was offered to prove
DOT's negligence. Plaintiff argued that the evidence was not offered to

44. 227 Ga. App. at 721, 490 S.E.2d at 148.
45. Id. (quoting Goss v. Total Chipping, 220 Ga. App. 643, 644, 469 S.E.2d 855, 858
(1996)).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Dawson, 270 Ga. 376, 509 S.E.2d 28 (1998).
49. Id. at 378, 509 SE.2d at 30.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 230 Ga. App. 585, 497 S.E.2d 72 (1998), affd, 270 Ga. 427, 511 S.E.2d 173 (1999).
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prove negligence but to demonstrate feasibility of repair, the DOT's prior
notice of the danger, and proximate cause. 3 The court of appeals
acknowledged that evidence of subsequent remedial measures is not
admissible to establish negligence but held that the evidence at issue
"was relevant and material to show that the absence of such conditions
was negligent maintenance and that the restoration was not a change
in condition within the evidentiary rule."54 This reasoning is clearly
suspect; regardless of whether the postaccident repairs were a "change
in condition" or a restoration to the original design, the changes were
remedial and in response to plaintiff's accident. Thus, if the evidence
was offered to prove negligence, as the court of appeals said it was, it
would seem to fall within the scope of the rule against subsequent
remedial measures evidence.
As it turned out, that was the view of the supreme court after it
granted certiorari.5 5 The supreme court concluded that evidence of the
postaccident changes "constituted proof of a fundamental post-collision
change in the actual configuration of the highway itself, and was not
evidence that, after only a temporary deviation, the highway was
restored to the condition which generally prevailed before the collision."" Thus, the court concluded that the court of appeals erred when
it held that the evidence was "admissible to show that the absence of
conditions at the time of the collision constituted negligent maintenance
by [the] DOT."5 7 However, the court held that this error was not
harmful because the DOT effectively admitted its negligence when it
conceded that it had failed to maintain the highway in accordance with
the original 1931 plans.58 Instead, the DOT argued that its negligence
was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.59 Under these
circumstances, evidence of the subsequent remedial measures was not
harmful.60
C. Relevancy of PriorSexual Behavior
Georgia's Rape Shield Statute prohibits the admission of evidence
relating to the prior sexual behavior of a rape victim unless the behavior
directly involved the accused and the evidence supports an inference

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

230 Ga. App. at 585-86, 497 S.E.2d at 73-74.
Id. at 587-88, 497 S.E.2d at 74-75.
Department of Transp. v. Cannady, 270 Ga. 427, 511 S.E.2d 173 (1999).
Id. at 428, 511 S.E.2d at 174-75.
Id., 511 S.E.2d at 175.
Id. at 429, 511 S.E.2d at 175.
Id.
Id.
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that the accused could have reasonably believed that the victim
consented to the sexual activity."' In Smith v. State,62 the supreme
court held that the Rape Shield Statute does not prohibit evidence that
a rape or molestation
victim has previously falsely accused others of
63
sexual misconduct.
The court of appeals addressed this particular application of the Rape
Shield Statute during the survey period in Tyson v. State." In 7Tson
the trial court excluded evidence that a molestation victim had made
prior false allegations of sexual molestation against another man.
Although that individual pleaded guilty to sexual battery, the evidence
showed that the victim had acknowledged lying about many of the
allegations she had made against that individual. Nevertheless, the
trial court excluded this evidence after it found that there was no
reasonable probability to believe that the child's prior allegations were
false, a prerequisite to the admission of evidence of prior false allegations. The trial court reasoned that because the prior perpetrator
pleaded guilty to sexual battery, the allegations were not false. 5 The
court of appeals found this conclusion clearly erroneous." Indeed, the
court found there was a certainty that the allegations, at least in part,
were false. 7 Accordingly, the trial court should have allowed defendant to offer evidence showing the falsity of those prior allegations. 6
D. Miscellaneous Relevancy Issues
In Anderson v. State, 9 the trial court granted defendant's motion to
sever and try separately two of the seven charges against defendant.
However, the trial court admitted at the subsequent trial evidence that
when defendant was arrested for the charges that were severed, he
attempted to flee. On appeal defendant argued that circumstances
surrounding an arrest other than the arrest for the crime at issue are
irrelevant and prejudicial. Thus, while evidence of flight may be
admissible as an admission of guilt for the charged offense, defendant
argued the fact that he fled while being arrested for a separate offense
could not be used to establish his guilt for the charged offense.7"

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3 (1995).
259 Ga. 135, 377 S.E.2d 158 (1989).
Id. at 137, 377 S.E.2d at 160.
232 Ga. App. 732, 503 S.E.2d 640 (1998).
Id. at 733-34, 503 S.E.2d at 642.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 734, 503 S.E.2d at 642.
236 Ga. App. 679, 513 S.E.2d 235 (1999).

70. Id. at 683, 513 S.E.2d at 239.
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The court of appeals disagreed, noting that the circumstances of an
arrest are admissible even though those circumstances may show that
defendant committed other crimes. 7
Thus, the circumstances surrounding defendant's arrest, including evidence of flight, were properly
admitted to show his state of mind and consciousness of guilt, notwithstanding the fact that he was being arrested for offenses other than the
ones for which he was being tried.72
Previous surveys have discussed the apparent changes in Georgia law
concerning offers to pay injured parties' medical expenses. Although the
court of appeals has not flatly held that such offers are inadmissible as
an admission of liability, it seems to have set the bar for the admission
of such evidence so high that, as a practical matter, such evidence would
rarely, if ever, be admissible.73
The court of appeals returned to this issue during the survey period
in Widner v. Brookins, Inc. 74 In Widner plaintiff contended that
defendant was responsible for the negligence of a contractor hired by
defendant to lay telephone cable. Defendant argued that the contractor
was an independent contractor; therefore, defendant was not liable for
the contractor's negligence. The trial court granted defendant's motion
for summary judgment. On appeal plaintiff argued that there was some
evidence of defendant's negligence because defendant's president visited
plaintiff and offered to pay her medical bills. 75 The court of appeals
disagreed.76 The court adopted the reasoning of Judge Beasley in her
special concurrence in Neubert v. Vigh. 77 Because there was no basis
for finding defendant liable to begin with, defendant's offer to pay
plaintiff's medical bills could not effectively admit liability for plaintiff's
injuries: "'An admission of liability has efficacy only if there is liability.
If there is none, then the statements of the alleged tortfeaser constitute
merely expressions of sympathy, benevolence, or an acceptance of moral
responsibility.' 7 In addition, after examining the context of the offer
the court concluded, apparently as a matter of law, that the offer was
simply a sympathetic offer of assistance and was not intended as an

71. Id. at 682, 513 S.E.2d at 239.
72. Id. at 683, 513 S.E.2d at 240.
73. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 44 MERCER L. REV. 213, 222-23 (1992); Marc T.
Treadwell, Evidence, 48 MERCER L. REV. 323, 337-39 (1996).
74. 236 Ga. App. 563, 512 S.E.2d 405 (1999).
75. Id. at 565, 512 S.E.2d at 407.
76. Id.
77. 218 Ga. App. 693, 462 S.E.2d 808 (1995).
78. 236 Ga. App. at 565, 512 S.E.2d at 407 (quoting Neubert v. Vigh, 218 Ga. App. 693,
695, 462 S.E.2d 808, 810 (1995) (Beasley, J., concurring specially)).
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admission of liability on the part of defendant.79 Arguably, the court
in Widner did not go as far as the cases discussed in previous surveys
which suggested that any offer to pay medical expenses would be
inadmissible as an admission of liability ° Rather, the holding of
Widner is that if there is no legal basis for liability, then such an offer
cannot be construed as an admission to establish liability.81
IV.

PRIVILEGES

Section 51-5-7 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.")
creates certain defenses to libel and slander actions.82 Specifically,
some communications are deemed "privileged" and, because they are
privileged, may not give rise to an action for libel or slander.8 " In
Zielinski v. Clorox Co.,84 the court of appeals held that the privileges
created by section 51-5-7 can be used as evidentiary privileges to prevent
the admission of a party's statement into evidence for impeachment
purposes.8 " The supreme court granted certiorari and reversed.8 The
court held that the privileges created by section 51-5-7 are clearly
intended to serve as defenses and not as evidentiary privileges.8 7
Furthermore, the purpose of an evidentiary privilege is to prevent the
disclosure of evidence to the jury." In contrast, a jury typically decides
89
whether a privilege defense to a libel and slander action is warranted.
Thus, the court held that the court of appeals erred in ruling that
section 51-5-7 provided a basis for excluding statements from evidence."
The supreme court in Zielinski also considered the issue of whether a
corporate employee could invoke the corporation's attorney-client
privilege when the corporation had waived the privilege. 9' In Zielinski
the corporation clearly waived the privilege when it gave the communications at issue to law enforcement officials. However, a corporate
employee argued that he nonetheless could assert the privilege because

79. Id. at 566, 512 S.E.2d at 407.
80. See Marc T. Treadwell, 48 MERCER L. REV. 323, 337-39 (1996).
81.

236 Ga. App. at 566, 512 S.E.2d at 407.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7 (1981 & Supp. 1999).
Id.
227 Ga. App. 760, 490 S.E.2d 448 (1997), rev'd, 270 Ga. 38, 504 S.E.2d 683 (1998).
Id. at 760, 490 S.E.2d at 449.
Zielinski v. Clorox Co., 270 Ga. 38, 504 S.E.2d 683 (1998).
Id. at 40, 504 S.E.2d at 685.
Id.

89.

Id.

90. Id.
91. Id. at 40-42, 504 S.E.2d at 685-86.
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the corporation could not waive his right to assert the privilege.9 2 The
supreme court held that the corporate attorney-client privilege belongs
to the corporation and not to corporate officers or employees.93 Thus,
an officer or employee cannot assert the corporation's privilege or
prohibit the corporation from waiving the privilege.94 To assert the
attorney-client privilege, the officer or employee must demonstrate a
personal attorney-client relationship.95 Relying on federal authority,
the court fashioned a test for determining when a corporate employee
can establish an individual attorney-client privilege with respect to
communications with corporate counsel.'
First, the employee must
show that he approached corporate counsel for legal advice.97 Second,
the employee must show that he sought legal advice in his individual
capacity rather than as a corporate representative.9" Third, the
employee must show that corporate counsel communicated with him in
the employee's individual capacity with knowledge that such representation may give rise to a conflict of interest.99 Fourth, the employee must
show that the communications were confidential. 00 Fifth, the employee must show that the subject matter of the communications did not
concern corporate matters.'0 ' Turning to the facts of Zielinski, the
court held that the corporate employee could not satisfy this test;
therefore, his communications with corporate counsel were not privileged
as to him individually. 102
The vast majority of Georgia lawyers will never encounter Georgia's
reporters' privilege.' 3 This privilege, was enacted in 1990 in response
to judicial decisions holding that the Georgia Constitution did not protect
a reporter from disclosing the identity of confidential sources.' 4
O.C.G.A. section 24-9-30 not only protects a reporter's confidential
sources, but also protects against the disclosure of any information

92. Id. at 40-41, 504 S.E.2d at 685-86.
93. Id. at 40, 504 S.E.2d at 685.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 40-41, 504 S.E.2d at 685.
96. Id. at 41, 504 S.E.2d at 685.
97. Id., 504 S.E.2d at 686 (quoting InternationalBhd. of Teamsters, 119 F.3d 210, 215
(2nd Cir. 1997)).
98. Id.

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 41-42, 504 S.E.2d at 686.
103. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-30 (1995).
104. See Howard v. Savannah College of Art & Design, 259 Ga. 795, 387 S.E.2d 332
(1990).
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obtained or prepared by the reporter.' °5 In In re Paul,'0 6 the supreme court addressed in some detail the burden of a party seeking to
overcome the reporter's privilege.'0 7 For those few lawyers who do
encounter this issue, this decision should be consulted.
In Price v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., °8 the court
of appeals addressed the issue of whether the psychiatrist-patient
privilege can be waived.'1 9 The court held that although this privilege
is frequently characterized as absolute, it can, in fact, be waived." °
In particular, a patient's failure to object to a third-party request served
pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 9-11-34(c)(2) constitutes a waiver of the
psychiatrist-patient privilege."'
V.

WITNESSES

A.

Impeachment Generally
In Bledsoe v. State," 2 defendant contended that the prosecution
improperly impeached his character during his trial for driving under
the influence of alcohol, habitual violator, and other charges. After the
incident giving rise to the charges, defendant applied for a probationary
driver's license. In the notarized application form, defendant affirmed
that he had not been cited for any traffic violations in the preceding two
years. At trial the prosecution, after eliciting testimony from defendant
that he had been cited for driving under the influence and habitual
violator, attempted to introduce the probationary license application.
Over defendant's objection, the trial court allowed the prosecution to
cross-examine the defendant about the allegedly false statement in the
application and admitted the application into evidence." 3 On appeal
the court of appeals first reviewed the ways in which the prosecution can
impeach a witness." 4 A prosecutor can (1) disprove specific facts
testified to by the witness, (2) introduce previous contradictory statements, (3) "'show bias, interest or corruption on the part of the witnes,'
(4) attack character, (5) show lack of personal knowledge on the part of

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

O.C.G.A. § 24-9-30.
270 Ga. 680, 513 S.E.2d 219 (1999).
Id. at 686, 513 S.E.2d at 224.
235 Ga. App. 792, 510 S.E.2d 582 (1998).
Id. at 793, 510 S.E.2d at 583.
Id., 510 S.E.2d at 584.
Id. at 793-94, 510 S.E.2d at 584.
236 Ga. App. 796, 513 S.E.2d 768 (1999).
Id. at 796-98, 513 S.E.2d at 769-70.
Id. at 798, 513 S.E.2d at 770.
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the witness, and (6) prove the absence of religious belief."' However,
the court of appeals noted the prosecution cannot attack a witness's
credibility by showing that he testified falsely with regard to a collateral
matter."' Recognizing that it had likely run afoul of this principle,
the prosecution argued that it did not use the application to prove that
defendant swore falsely, but rather to prove a point that was at issue;
namely, whether defendant was driving on the night of his arrest for the
charged offenses, a point that defendant disputed." ' The court of
appeals rejected this argument." ' The record showed that the prosecution acknowledged several times that it wanted to use the application
to impeach defendant's credibility. "' Moreover, the application clearly
did not show that defendant was driving when arrested for the charged
offenses. 2 ° It simply showed that he may have lied several months
after he was arrested. 2 ' The only possible reason for the introduction
of the application was to show that defendant made a false statement
about a collateral matter.'22 Thus, the trial court erred when it
allowed the prosecution to cross-examine defendant about the application
and when it submitted the application into evidence. 2 '
B.

Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction

Georgia law permits the impeachment of a witness by evidence of
conviction of a felony or a crime of moral turpitude.'24 In Lastinger v.
Mill & Machinery, Inc.,'25 the court of appeals reaffirmed what should
have been a well-known fact: a misdemeanor conviction for possession
of marijuana is not a crime of moral turpitude.'26
VI.

OPINION TESTIMONY

Since Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,'27 federal courts
have struggled mightily with their new gatekeeper role in scrutinizing

115. Id. (quoting Haynes v. State, 180 Ga. App. 202, 203, 349 S.E.2d at 208, 210

(1986)).
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117.
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119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 798-99, 513 S.E.2d at 770.

122. Id.
123. Id. at 799, 513 S.E.2d at 770.
124. See Ailstock v. State, 159 Ga. App. 482, 485, 283 S.E.2d 698, 701 (1981).
125. 236 Ga. App. 430, 512 S.E.2d 327 (1999).

126. Id. at 431, 512 S.E.2d at 328.
127.

509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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expert evidence. Georgia courts have resisted appeals to follow the
United States Supreme Court's lead and require Georgia trial courts to
subject proffered expert testimony to more rigorous examination. During
the current survey period, the court of appeals again stood fast. In
Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Baker,"8 a jury found the defendant
railroad liable for the death of plaintiff's husband, a railroad employee.
Plaintiff contended that defendant failed to provide her husband with a
safe place to work in violation of the Federal Employers Liability Act
("FELA"). 129 Plaintiff's experts testified that repeated exposure to
diesel exhaust caused her husband's nasopharyngeal cancer. On appeal
defendant, relying on Daubert,argued that plaintiff's medical expert did
not provide a probable scientific basis for his opinion that diesel exhaust
caused the decedent's fatal nasopharyngeal cancer.130 The court of
appeals refused to adopt Daubert and reiterated Georgia's test for the
admissibility of expert testimony. 3 ' If an expert is properly qualified
in the field in which he offers testimony, and if the facts upon which the
expert relies are in evidence, the issues of whether there is sufficient
knowledge upon which to base the opinion or whether the opinion is
based on hearsay go to the weight and credibility of the testimony, not
its admissibility.1 2 The court acknowledged that Georgia law requires
that the scientific data upon which the expert relies must be sufficiently
established, but after reviewing the bases for the plaintiff's expert's
opinions, the court concluded that his "explanation for his opinion
regarding the cause of the decedent's cancer [was] sufficient to demonstrate a 'reasonable probability' of a causal connection between the
decedent's exposure to diesel exhaust and his nasopharyngeal can133
cer."
Of course, Georgia courts do not admit expert testimony simply
because it is testimony given by an expert. Although the court of
appeals found in Baker that the scientific data upon which the plaintiff's
expert relied was sufficient to support his conclusions,"' the court of
5
appeals in Izer v. State"1
held that the State had not proved that laser
speed-detection devices had reached a scientific stage of verifiable

128. 237 Ga. App. 292, 514 S.E.2d 448 (1999).
129. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994).
130. 237 Ga. App. at 294, 514 S.E.2d at 451.
131. Id.
132. Id. (quoting Orkin Exterminating Co. v. McIntosh, 215 Ga. App. 587, 592-93, 452
S.E.2d at 159, 165 (1994)).
133. Id. at 295, 514 S.E.2d at 452.
134. Id. at 294-95, 514 S.E.2d at 752.
135. 236 Ga. App. 282, 511 S.E.2d 625 (1999).
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certainty." 6 In Izer defendant argued that his speeding conviction
should be overturned because although the State determined his speed
through the use of a laser speed-detection device, it offered no evidence
establishing the reliability of such device."3 7 The court noted that
Georgia applies the so-called Harper test. 8 to determine the admissibility of novel scientific evidence.3 9 A party relying on novel scientific
evidence must prove that the procedure or technique has reached a
scientific stage of verifiable certainty. 4 ° This test is satisfied if the
procedure or technique at issue has been recognized in a substantial
number of other jurisdictions or the party offering the evidence can
adduce evidence establishing that the procedure or technique has
The trial court's
reached the requisite stage of development.'"
In Izer the
determination can also be based on learned treatises.4
State did not offer any expert testimony to establish that laser speeddetection devices had "reached a scientific stage of verifiable certainty.""
Moreover, although many courts had recognized the scientific
reliability of radar-based detection devices, laser-based devices had not
Thus, because the state did
been widely accepted by other courts.'
not meet its burden of proving that laser-based speed-detection devices
45
were scientifically reliable, the court reversed defendant's conviction.
The General Assembly reacted quickly to Izer. In an act that became
effective March 25, 1999, it amended Title 40 to provide that "evidence
of speed based on a speed detection device using the speed timing
principles of laser ... shall be considered scientifically acceptable and
reliable as a speed detection device and shall be admissible for all
purposes
in any court, judicial, or administrative proceedings in this
146
state."
In Barlow v. State, 47 the supreme court granted certiorari to
consider an issue of first impression: whether a defendant in a criminal
case can introduce expert evidence concerning the victim interviewing

136. Id. at 282, 511 S.E.2d at 627.
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See Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 292 S.E.2d 389 (1982).
236 Ga. App. at 282, 511 S.E.2d at 626.
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Id., 511 S.E.2d at 626-27.
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Id., 511 S.E.2d at 627.
Id. at 283, 511 S.E.2d at 627.
Id. at 284, 511 S.E.2d at 628.
O.C.G.A. § 40-14-17 (Supp. 1999).
270 Ga. 54, 507 S.E.2d 416 (1998).
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techniques used by law enforcement officials.148 In Barlow defendant,
who was charged with child molestation, attempted to introduce expert
testimony regarding techniques used by investigators when they
interviewed the victim. Defendant argued that a victim's statements
could be shaped and affected by interviewing techniques. The trial court
held that the subject matter of the testimony was not beyond the ken of
lay people; therefore, expert testimony on the subject was inadmissible. 149 The court of appeals agreed, but the supreme court reversed. 5 ° The court specifically noted that child molestation cases are
a "'special lot'" and the child's account of the molestation can be affected
by investigators' techniques.1"' The court acknowledged that an expert
cannot opine whether the victim's allegations are false,' 52 but "the fact
that limited expert testimony regarding proper interview techniques
indirectly involves the child's credibility does not render it inadmissible."' 53 Although a trial court may exercise its discretion and exclude
such expert testimony if it is not based upon facts and evidence, or is
otherwise deficient, such testimony is not inadmissible on the grounds
54
that it does not concern a matter beyond the ken of lay people.
In Pyron v. State,'55 the court of appeals addressed this issue in the
context of a child cruelty case. The court acknowledged that Barlow
concerned sexual abuse of children, whereas in Pyron defendant was
charged with physical abuse of children, but the court held that this was
not a distinction that made a difference.' 56 The pertinent issue was
whether a child's account of an alleged act of abuse could be shaped or
affected by techniques used by interviewers.'57 Thus, the court held
that the trial court erred when it refused to allow defendant to rely on
expert testimony regarding interview techniques used by law enforcement officials.'55

148. Id. at 54, 507 S.E.2d at 417.
149. Id. at 54-56, 507 S.E.2d at 417-18.
150. Id. at 54, 507 S.E.2d at 417.
151. Id. at 55, 507 S.E.2d at 418 (quoting State v. Gersin, 668 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ohio
1996)).
152. This issue, the extent to which expert testimony is admissible to bolster
allegations of child abuse, has been a contentious one for Georgia courts. See generally
Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 50 MERCER L. REV. 229, 243-45 (1998).
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270 Ga. at 55, 507 S.E.2d at 418.
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Id. at 56, 507 S.E.2d at 418.
237 Ga. App. 198, 514 S.E.2d 51 (1999).
Id. at 199, 514 S.E.2d at 53.
Id. at 198-99, 514 S.E.2d at 52.
Id. at 200, 514 S.E.2d at 53.
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In a landmark decision, the supreme court in 1981 held in Smith v.
State5 ' that a defendant charged with the murder of an abusive
spouse can offer expert testimony regarding battered woman's syndrome
to explain why defendant did not leave her abusive husband, why she
did not inform police or friends about the abuse, or to generally explain
why a defendant killed her husband. 6 ° In Parrish v. State,'6 1 the
court of appeals held that the State could use the battered woman's
syndrome testimony to explain why a victim did not cry for help or flee
when she had an opportunity. 6 2 However, the expert in Parrish also
testified about the typical characteristics of an abusive spouse, saying
that they usually grew up in homes where physical violence was present,
have criminal records, and have a history of alcohol or drug abuse. 6 '
The court agreed with defendant that this testimony improperly and
unnecessarily impinged defendant's character."
However, the court
165
concluded that this error was harmless.
Finally, the court of appeals returned to a recurring issue during the
survey period-the extent to which police officers can give opinion
testimony in civil suits arising from accidents they investigated. In
Carnes v. Woodall," plaintiff argued that the trial court improperly
permitted the investigating police officer to testify that defendant could
not have seen plaintiff before the collision that caused plaintiff's injuries.
Plaintiff, a professional wheelchair racer, was injured when defendant,
after stopping at a stop sign, pulled her vehicle into plaintiff's path. The
investigating officer, after testifying that plaintiff was wearing dark
clothing, that his wheelchair had a low profile, and that lighting was
minimal, testified that it would67have been virtually impossible for
defendant to have seen plaintiff.
Relying on the supreme court's decision in Johnson v. Knebel,' the
court of appeals noted that lay witnesses may give opinion testimony
when their opinion is based on their own observations and when the
opinion is necessary for the witness to convey those observations to the
jury.'69 Although the opinion of a lay witness is not admissible when
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161.
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247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981).
Id. at 619, 277 S.E.2d at 683.
237 Ga. App. 274, 514 S.E.2d 458 (1999).
Id. at 277, 514 S.E.2d at 463.
Id. at 276, 514 S.E.2d at 462.
Id. at 277, 514 S.E.2d at 463.

165. Id.
166. 233 Ga. App. 797, 505 S.E.2d 537 (1998).
167. Id. at 798, 505 S.E.2d at 538.
168. 267 Ga. 853, 485 S.E.2d 451 (1997).

169. 233 Ga. App. at 798, 505 S.E.2d at 538.
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the jury can readily reach its own opinion based on the facts in evidence,
the court of appeals found that the facts alone did not provide the jury
with a clear understanding of the extent to which plaintiff was visible
to defendant as he approached the intersection, "[blut the disinterested
observer on the scene could convey the fact by opinion from a totality of
the then-existing circumstances." 70
It is interesting that in Carnes, the court of appeals relied heavily on
the fact that the officer was tendered as a lay witness and not as an
expert witness,. 7' because in Brent v. State,172 the supreme court
took the opposite approach. In Brent defendant contended that the trial
court improperly allowed a deputy to testify that in the deputy's
professional opinion defendant was driving under the influence of
alcohol.'73 The court opined, "It is the officer's training and experience
that makes the results of field sobriety tests meaningful. Without that
expert interpretation the trier of fact is unable to evaluate the evidence
properly before them."'74 It would seem that whether the investigating
officer testifies as an expert or as a lay witness is not significant.
Perhaps, as a practical matter, the courts are willing to allow police
officers, as "disinterested observers," greater latitude in rendering
opinion testimony.
Previous survey articles have chronicled the apparent confusion with
regard to whether an expert witness can base his opinion on hearsay. ' Although most cases addressing the issue seem to hold that an
expert cannot, to any extent, base his opinion on hearsay, a strong line
of cases holds to the contrary. 7 The most notable of these is King v.
Browning.'77 During the current survey period, the supreme court
tackled this dichotomy in Leonard v. State.178 In Leonard the trial
court refused to allow defendant's DNA expert to testify to his opinions
based on the State's DNA test methods and results because the test
results were not introduced in the evidence and there was no testimony
about test methods. 7 9 Under these circumstances the supreme court
held that the trial court properly excluded this testimony.'8 0 The court
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See, e.g., Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 46 MERCER L. REV. 233, 250-51 (1994).
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noted that generally an expert can testify based on his personal
knowledge of relevant facts or he can testify in response to a hypothetical question, but the facts stated in the hypothetical must be in
evidence.'
Turning to the line of cases allowing experts to base their opinions on
hearsay, including King v. Browning, the court held "[iun cases in which
an expert's opinion is based in part on hearsay, the testimony may be
admitted. " 18 2 This principle "does not provide a mechanism by which
hearsay that forms the sole basis of an expert's opinion can be placed
before the jury in violation of the basic rules of evidence."'
Leonard,
it seems, resolves the issue of whether expert testimony can be based on
hearsay, but it raises a new question. At what point does an expert's
opinion become so based on hearsay that it becomes inadmissible?
There is one well-recognized exception to the principle that opinion
evidence cannot be based exclusively on hearsay, and this exception was
reaffirmed during the survey period. In Braswell v. Henderson,"
plaintiffs sued defendants for breach of a contract for the purchase of a
liquor store. Plaintiffs contended the wholesale value of the store's
inventory was less than what the defendants represented. Plaintiffs
sought to establish the amount of this shortfall by relying in part on the
store's records revealing the wholesale prices of the inventory. However,
these records were not adfitted in evidence. After judgment in favor of
plaintiffs, defendants appealed, claiming that the evidence of value was
based on hearsay, and thus was inadmissible and had no probative
value. 1" The court of appeals disagreed, reasoning that so long as a
witness testifying about value states the basis for his opinion, the fact
that his opinion is based on hearsay goes to the weight of the opinion
and not its admissibility.186 Only if the witness's testimony reveals no
rational basis or reason for his opinion should the testimony be
excluded."'
In Braswell the computerized inventory records were
maintained by defendants or their daughter and all confirmed that the
records were accurate.'
Although the computer records did not
precisely reflect the wholesale price of the store's physical inventory, the
court nevertheless found that they provided a rational basis for
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estimating the value of the inventory; therefore, the trial court properly
admitted plaintiffs' opinions on value even though they were based on
hearsay.,8 9
VII.
A.

HEARSAY

The Necessity Exception

It is difficult to use superlatives when discussing evidence law; the
subject does not normally lend itself to overheated or passionate rhetoric.
However, the evolution of Georgia's necessity exception to the rule
against hearsay has been truly incredible. This new exception to the
hearsay rule can be traced to the supreme court's decision in McKissick
v. State.'9° McKissick cited O.C.G.A. section 24-3-1(b) as the basis for
the necessity exception,"9 but it seems that this provision provides
shaky support for the far reaching necessity exception. 9 2 O.C.G.A.
section 24-3-1(b) limits the use of hearsay evidence, stating that hearsay
evidence is admissible "only in specified cases from necessity."9 3 Ten
years ago, research would have indicated that the "specified cases"
referred to firmly established statutory and common-law exceptions to
the hearsay rule. In McKissick, however, the supreme court read section
24-3-1(b) expansively rather than restrictively, reasoning that it "permits
the use of hearsay evidence 'in specified cases from necessity.", 94 The
court omitted from its quotation of the statute the word "only." The
court went on to note that the statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule
were not exhaustive and that hearsay evidence could be admitted in the
absence of a statutory exception if "'necessity' and 'particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness' are established."'95
During the current survey period, the supreme court modified the twopronged test for the admission of evidence under the necessity exception.
In Chapel v. State,'96 the supreme court held that in addition to
necessity and particular guarantees of trustworthiness, the party
offering the evidence must also show that "the statement is relevant to

189. Id.
190. 263 Ga. 188, 429 S.E.2d 655 (1993).
191. O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1(b) (1995).
192. 263 Ga. at 189, 429 S.E.2d at 657. See Lane v. Tift County Hosp. Auth., 228 Ga.
App. 554, 492 S.E.2d 317 (1997). Swain v. C & S Bank of Albany, 258 Ga. 547, 372 S.E.2d
423 (1988), has been cited as authority for the necessity exception. This is debatable.
Swain analyzed a decedent's statement under principles relating to dying declarations.
193. O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1(b).
194. 263 Ga. at 189, 429 S.E.2d at 657 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1(b)).
195. Id. (quoting Mallory v. State, 261 Ga. 625, 627, 409 S.E.2d 839, 841 (1991)).
196. 270 Ga. 151, 510 S.E.2d 802 (1998).
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a material fact and that the statement is more probative on that
material fact than other evidence that may be procured and offered."' 97
The supreme court added this additional prong to the necessity exception
to "help ensure that the necessity exception does not render the rules of
evidence meaningless and allow the conduct of trials by hearsay."'98
However, the supreme court also expanded the situations in which the
necessity exception can be used. In Holmes v. State,'99 the supreme
court addressed the unavailability requirement of the necessity
exception. In Holmes the trial court admitted the statement of a witness
who could not be located by prosecutors. Defendant contended that the
fact that the State could not locate the witness did not make the witness
unavailable for the purpose of applying the necessity exception.0 °
However, the supreme court concluded that in view of its decision in
Chapel grafting a third element to the necessity exception, "there is
clearly no need, if there ever was, to restrict the meaning of 'unavailability' to instances of death, privilege, and deliberate hiding."20 ' The
court concluded that a declarant is unavailable if the proponent has
made reasonable, but unsuccessful, efforts to locate the witness and
secure his attendance at trial.2 2
Chief Justice Benham and Justices Sears and Thompson concurred
specially.203 In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Benham, the
specially concurring justices criticized the "plurality's unnecessary
expansion of the 'necessity exception' to the rule against the admission
of hearsay."201 Chief Justice Benham argued that a witness should be
considered unavailable only if the witness is dead or if the witness
exercises a valid privilege against testifying.2 5 Chief Justice Benham
criticized the plurality for relying on Jones v. State20 6 to support its
conclusion.2 7 Jones, Chief Justice Benham wrote, did not involve the
necessity exception but rather the prior testimony exception to the

197. Id. at 155, 510 S.E.2d at 807.
198. Id.
199. 271 Ga. 138, 516 S.E.2d 61 (1999) (plurality opinion).
200. Id. at 138, 516 S.E.2d at 62.
201. Id. at 139, 516 S.E.2d at 62.
202. Id. at 140, 516 S.E.2d at 63.
203. Id. at 141, 516 S.E.2d at 63.
204. Id. (Benham, C.J., concurring specially). Chief Justice Benham repeatedly and
pointedly noted that the court's decision was a plurality, not a majority, opinion. Id. at
141-44, 516 S.E.2d at 63-66. Justice Fletcher concurred only in the judgment of the court.
Id. at 141, 516 S.E.2d at 63.
205. Id. at 142, 516 S.E.2d at 64.
206. 250 Ga. 166, 296 S.E.2d 598 (1982).
207. 271 Ga. at 143-44, 516 S.E.2d at 65.
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hearsay rule.2 °8 It was appropriate to use a lenient standard of
unavailability for the prior testimony exception because the out-of-court
statements at issue are given under oath in proceedings that involved
substantially the same issue and substantially the same parties.0 9
These safeguards are not present in the typical case involving the
necessity exception, nor were they present in Holmes where the
statement at issue was one made by a witness to police.210 Chief
Justice Benham did leave open the possibility that he would agree that
a witness deliberately hiding to avoid testifying could be considered
unavailable.2"
Lest one gets the impression that the supreme court has completely
opened the floodgates to hearsay statements, it should be noted that the
appellate courts found in several cases during the survey period that
statements were erroneously admitted pursuant to the necessity
exception. In Harrison v. State,2 te the court of appeals held that the
trial court erroneously admitted the hearsay statement of a witness
because there were two additional eyewitnesses who were present, and
thus the hearsay testimony was not necessary.21 Interestingly, the
court stated that hearsay testimony could possibly be admissible even
when there are other witnesses who can testify to the subject matter of
the hearsay statement,2 14 failing to acknowledge the supreme court's
decision in Chapel that the hearsay statement must be "more probative
on that 21
material
fact than other evidence that may be procured and
5
offered."

In Azizi v. State,2 6 defendant contended that the trial court erroneously allowed his wife's lover to testify about statements made by the
wife in defendant's trial for the murder of his wife. 217 The supreme
court agreed, noting that statements about marital problems made by a
married person to his or her lover are not sufficiently trustworthy to be
admissible under the necessity exception.218
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In Atwater v. State,219 the court of appeals rejected defendant's
attempt to rely on the necessity exception.22 ° In Atwater defendant
subpoenaed a witness to appear at a hearing on his motion to suppress
evidence. When the witness did not appear, defendant's attorney
proffered the testimony of a legal assistant with the public defender's
office who had interviewed the witness the day before the hearing.
Defendant contended that because the witness was unavailable, the legal
assistant should be allowed to testify to the substance of the witness's
statements.22 ' The court of appeals disagreed, concluding that the
witness's statement was not trustworthy.222 The witness was a close

friend of defendant, the witness's statement was not spontaneous and
was clearly made in preparation of trial, and was not corroborated by
any other evidence. 22
Just as courts are reluctant to admit extrinsic act evidence in civil
cases, the necessity exception is applied almost exclusively in criminal
cases. In Lane v. 71ft County Hospital Authority,224 a decision discussed in last year's survey,225 the court of appeals first applied the
necessity exception by name in a civil case. 22' During the current
survey period, in Lewis v. Emory University,227 the court of appeals
again applied the necessity exception in a civil case.228 In Lewis
plaintiff argued that the trial court erroneously excluded from evidence
hearsay statements attributed to a respiratory therapist. Plaintiff
contended that defendant was responsible for her husband's death
following a heart attack he suffered while being treated at defendant's
hospital. Plaintiff further contended that a therapist's statements to two
colleagues and to the decedent's brother were necessary to prove when
her husband went into cardiac arrest. Defendant argued the therapist's
statements were not relevant or necessary because other witnesses were
present at the time of the events. However, the therapist's statements

219.

233 Ga. App. 339, 503 S.E.2d 919 (1998).

220. Id. at 342, 503 S.E.2d at 923.
221. Id. at 341, 503 S.E.2d at 922.
222. Id., 503 S.E.2d at 922-23.
223. Id. at 341-42, 503 S.E.2d at 922-23. The appellate courts reaffirmed several times
during the survey period that a witness who invokes a marital privilege against testifying
is unavailable for the purpose of the application of the necessity exception. See, e.g.,
Perkins v. State, 269 Ga. 791, 505 S.E.2d 16 (1998); Kwon v. State, 238 Ga. App. 617, 517
S.E.2d 83 (1999); Sorrow v. State, 234 Ga. App. 357, 505 S.E.2d 842 (1998).
224. 228 Ga. App. 554, 492 S.E.2d 317 (1997).
225. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 50 MERCER L. REV. 229, 250-51 (1998).
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contradicted the testimony of those witnesses.229 The court of appeals
held that was sufficient to establish that the testimony was both
necessary and relevant. 230 Addressing the trustworthiness requirement, the court noted that the therapist was a hospital employee, and
thus her statements were against defendant's interest.2"' Although the
therapist was a friend of the decedent, the court noted that there was no
evidence that her statements were self-serving or were calculated to
benefit the deceased.23 2 In one case, the therapist's statement was
made to a colleague the morning after she attended to the decedent and
was made in the course of her duties.23 3 Moreover, all the statements
were consistent.2
The fact that the statements were inconsistent
with the testimony of other witnesses does not establish a lack of
trustworthiness.2 5 Therefore, the court of appeals held that the trial
court abused its discretion when it refused to admit the evidence of the
therapist's out-of-court statements.2 6
B.

PriorOut-of-Court Statements
For those fascinated with dramatic developments in evidentiary law,
or for those who otherwise have a low threshold for fascination, the
recent developments surrounding the supreme court's landmark decision
in Cuzzort v. State23 7 will be of interest. In Cuzzort the supreme
court, in apparent frustration over the difficulty of securing convictions
in child molestation cases prior to the enactment of the Child Hearsay
Statute, 23 8 held that a prior consistent statement is admissible as
substantive evidence against an accused if the witness is present at the
trial and subject to cross-examination.239 The court in Cuzzort specifically noted that the "statement was not limited in value to impeachment
but was substantive evidence of the matter asserted."24° Of course,
Georgia now has the Child Hearsay Statute and, as discussed in last
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year's survey article,241 in Woodard v. State,242 the supreme court
dramatically weakened Cuzzort.2"
In Woodard the court held that prior consistent statements are not
generally admissible but rather can be admitted only when the veracity
of the witness who made the statement has been placed at issue. 2"
The court's pronouncement was clear: "Unless a witness's veracity has
affirmatively been placed in issue, the witness's prior consistent
statement is pure hearsay evidence, which cannot be admitted merely
to corroborate the witness, or to bolster the witness's credibility in the
eyes of the jury." "' The court in Woodard did not expressly address
the issue of whether a prior consistent statement is admissible as
substantive evidence, but it seems implicit in the holding that it is not.
If the statement can only be offered to bolster a witness whose credibility
has been questioned, it seems necessarily to follow that the evidence is
not admissible as substantive evidence.
The court of appeals appears to have been slow in its recognition of
Woodard. During the current survey period, the court held in Moore v.
State24 6 and in Pirkle v. State247 that prior consistent statements
were admissible under Cuzzort without regard to whether the witness's
veracity has been called into question. 2" By the end of the survey
however, the court of appeals grudgingly acknowledged Woodperiod,
24 9
ard.
In Jenkins v. State,25 ° the court of appeals addressed a rather novel
constitutional challenge to the admission of prior consistent statements.
In Jenkins several witnesses testified to statements made by a child
victim of molestation. Relying on Woodard and the United States
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242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 50 MERCER L. REV. 229, 248-49 (1998).
269 Ga. 317, 496 S.E.2d 896 (1998).
Id. at 319 n.14, 496 S.E.2d at 899.
Id. at 320, 496 S.E.2d at 899-900.
Id.
234 Ga. App. 424, 506 S.E.2d 925 (1998).
234 Ga. App. 23, 506 S.E.2d 186 (1998).
See 234 Ga. App. at 426-27, 506 S.E.2d at 927; 234 Ga. App. at 23, 506 S.E.2d at

188.
249. See Carter v. State, 238 Ga. App. 708, 520 S.E.2d 15 (1999). Acknowledging that
a prior consistent statement is admissible only when the veracity of a witness's trial
testimony has been placed at issue, the court of appeals held that veracity can be
challenged expressly or impliedly, and the court found that defendant had impliedly
challenged the veracity of the informant, thus opening the door to the admission of the
informant's prior consistent statement.
250. 235 Ga. App. 53, 508 S.E.2d 710 (1998).
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Supreme Court's holding in Tome v. United States,"5 ' defendant argued
that prior consistent statements by a victim are not relevant unless the
victim's testimony is impeached, or is challenged as being a recent
fabrication, or is the product of improper influence or motive.252 The
court of appeals rejected this argument because Tome simply addressed
the admissibility of prior consistent statements under Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) and thus was not applicable. 5 ' The pertinent
issue in Woodard was not whether the statement was admissible under
the Child Hearsay Statute but rather whether it was admissible under
Cuzzort.2 ' As discussed above, the court in Woodard concluded that
prior consistent statements are not admissible unless the veracity of the
witness has been questioned.2 55 However, the Child Hearsay Statute
does not require that the victim's veracity be questioned as a prerequisite to the admissibility of a prior consistent statement.2 56 So long as
the requirements of the statute are met, the prior consistent statement
is admissible.2 5 7 The court found that the requirements of the statute
were met and because neither Tome nor Woodard were pertinent, the
Court affirmed defendant's conviction.2 8
C. The Business Records Exception
Proving the amount of attorney fees has long been an area of some
confusion. The court of appeals returned to this difficult issue in
Southern Co. v. Hamburg.259 The reader can decide whether the court
left the field any less confusing. In Hamburg the court of appeals
considered for the second time an award of attorney fees to an employee
in a dispute with his former employer. In its first opinion the court of
appeals reversed the trial court's reward of $2,009,681 in attorney fees
on the grounds that billing summaries used to prove the amount of the
attorney fees were hearsay.21 The court then remanded the case to
the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of the
attorney fees. 2 1 The trial court then reentered its prior award based

251. 513 U.S. 150 (1995). Tome is discussed in Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 47
MERCER L. REv. 837, 845-46 (1996).
252. 235 Ga. App. at 54, 508 S.E.2d at 712.
253. Id.
254. 269 Ga. at 318, 496 S.E.2d at 898.
255. Id. at 320, 496 S.E.2d at 899-900.
256. 235 Ga. App. at 56, 508 S.E.2d at 713.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 56-57, 508 S.E.2d at 713.
259. 233 Ga. App. 135, 503 S.E.2d 383 (1998).
260. Southern Co. v. Hamburg, 220 Ga. App. 834, 842, 470 S.E.2d 467, 474 (1996).
261. Id. at 842-43, 470 S.E.2d at 474.
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on the same evidence. The trial judge did this because of the court of
appeals' intervening decision in Santora v. American Combustion,
Inc.262 In Santora the court of appeals held that legal billing sheets
were 26admissible
under the business record exception to the hearsay
3
rule.

In Hamburg II the court of appeals, although "recognizing the trial
court's understandable confusion over what to do in light of the panel
decision in Santora," nevertheless faulted the trial court for failing to
follow its opinion in HamburgL 2' The court reasoned that its holding
in Hamburg I became the law of the case and thus should have been
applied by the trial court notwithstanding the intervening decision in
Santora. 25" Accordingly, the court of appeals
remanded the case to the
266
trial court for an evidentiary hearing.
Judge Eldridge, apparently concerned that the court had not quite
clarified the issue, concurred specially and attempted to clarify further
the proof necessary to recover attorney fees.267 Judge Eldridge acknowledged that Santora held that billing records may be admissible
under the business records exception to the hearsay rule.268 However,
for each attorney for whose service compensation is sought to be
recovered, there must be admissible evidence proving the value of those
services, and the other party has the right to cross-examine each witness
on the amount and reasonableness of the fees requested. 269 Nevertheless, the attorney or paralegal who performed the work need not
testify.270 Any person who is familiar with the method of keeping the
records, and can identify them, may lay the foundation necessary to
make the records admissible under the business records exception. 7
The court stated:
It would appear that the necessary degree of familiarity could be
obtained through a number of common business practices, such as
being the records' custodian, making the entries during the usual
course of employment, observing the method of record keeping through
on-the-job training, experience or observation, or by attending courses

225 Ga. App. 771, 485 S.E.2d 34 (1997).
263. Id. at 776, 485 S.E.2d at 39.
262.
264.

233 Ga. App. at 136, 503 S.E.2d at 384.

265. Id.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Id., 503 S.E.2d at 385.
Id. at 137, 503 S.E.2d at 385 (Eldridge, J., concurring specially).
Id.
Id. at 138, 503 S.E.2d at 385.
Id.
Id., 503 S.E.2d at 385-86.
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of instruction sponsored by the business regarding the method of
keeping the particular business records in question.272
Moreover, Georgia law permits the use of summaries to prove voluminous facts such as numerous entries in books of accounts or other
business records. 273 However, if all of the attorney fees contained in
the billing records are not subject to recovery, then the party seeking the
recovery of attorney fees has the burden of segregating out the fees that
are recoverable from those not.274
It is not clear exactly where things stand after HamburgI, Hamburg
II, and Santora. While it is clear that the court of appeals has held that
the business records exception applies to attorney's billing records,275
it does seem that the court is requiring a higher burden of proof for
attorney's billing records than for other business records.
D.

Res gestae

In several prior survey articles, the author has joined those who
criticize "that near-insoluble enigma of our law, which we call res
gestae."275 Indeed, legal scholars much more astute than the author
have concluded that the res gestae doctrine is simply incapable of being
understood.
Res gestae is a Gordian Knot, which no one has succeeded in
untying. Lacking an Alexander, it remains as yet unsevered.
This brief survey should be sufficient to demonstrate the futility of
attempting now still another definition, for like Joel Chandler Harris'
277
tar baby, striking another blow means getting stuck another time!
That having been said, and bearing in mind that hard cases make bad
law, it is difficult to quarrel with the application of the res gestae
doctrine in Sims v.. State.275 In Sims defendant was charged with
breaking into the home of his estranged girlfriend and their two
daughters, who were five and seven years old at the time. Defendant
dragged the mother from the home and repeatedly stabbed her during
a struggle that lasted between thirty minutes and an hour. Defendant
then put the mother and the girls into his car and, after driving around

272.
S.E.2d
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id., 503 S.E.2d at 386 (quoting Hertz Corp. v. McCray, 198 Ga. App. 484, 486, 402
298, 302 (1991)).
Id. at 138-39, 503 S.E.2d at 386.
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Id. at 139, 503 S.E.2d at 386.
Andrews v. State, 249 Ga. 223, 225, 290 S.E.2d 71, 73 (1982).
Id. at 227, 290 S.E.2d at 74.
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aimlessly for a period of time, parked the car at a stranger's house and
left. The seven-year-old daughter managed to awaken someone at the
house who called the police. When the police arrived, the daughter told
them that her father had broken into their home, stabbed her mother,
and forced them into the car. At trial, the police officer testified to this
statement. 9
Defendant contended that the child's statement was not admissible
2 ° The court of appeals agreed. 21 1
under the Child Hearsay Statute.
As discussed in a previous survey,282 a 1995 amendment to the Child
Hearsay Statute that would have allowed the admission of a child's
statement concerning sexual abuse of another in the presence of the
child, was declared unconstitutional by the supreme court. 2 3 However, in Sims, the court of appeals found the child's statement to be
admissible as part of the res gestae.2 4 Noting that the law seeks to
guard not against "after-speech" but rather "after thought," the court
found that the daughter's statement was part of one continuous
transaction and was closely connected in time to the events she
described. 28 5 The court found no evidence that she had been coached
or otherwise induced to make the statement. 6 Nor was there evidence that she made the statement with any knowledge of its impact.2 7

Under these circumstances, the court found the statement

admissible.288

VIII.

AUTHENTICATION AND BEST EVIDENCE

A.

Authentication
The court of appeals rendered two significant decisions concerning the
authentication of documentary evidence. In Davis v. First Healthcare
Corp.,289 plaintiffs contended that defendant, a nursing home, was
responsible for the death of a relative who died while a patient of the
nursing home. Plaintiffs argued that defendant had violated physician
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Id. at 678-79, 507 S.E.2d at 845-46.
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234 Ga. App. at 681-82, 507 S.E.2d at 848-49.
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orders by not properly restraining the decedent. As a result, the
decedent fell and later died. In response to defendant's motion for
summary judgment, plaintiffs attempted to rely on a medication record
produced by defendant.2"
This record clearly indicated that the
decedent's physician had ordered the nursing home to restrain the
patient when she was sitting in her wheelchair and while she was in bed
at nighttime "'to prevent pt. injury."' 29' However, the trial court ruled
that plaintiff had not properly authenticated this document and
therefore did not consider it. Finding no other evidence disputing
defendant's contentions, the trial court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment.29 2 On appeal plaintiffs contended that the
medication record had been properly authenticated because defendant
produced it for them in response to a request for production of documents.293
This, the court of appeals noted, was an issue of first impression in
Georgia. 294 The court found that the production of a party's document
in response to a discovery request, along with "other circumstances,"
may sufficiently authenticate a document. 95 In Davis the court held
the "other circumstances" were sufficient to meet the authentication
requirement.2 96 First, the response to the discovery request stated
that defendant's medication records concerning decedent were attached
to the response.297 Second, the entries on the document all confirmed
that the document was what it proported to be, that is, the decedent's
medication record.298 Under these circumstances, the court held that
the document had been properly authenticated, and because it was
admissible as a party admission under O.C.G.A. section 24-3-3 1,299 the
trial court should have considered the document when ruling on
defendant's motion for summary judgment." 0
In Jackson v. State,"°' defendant contended that the State had not
properly authenticated a certificate of inspection for a breath test
machine in his trial for driving under the influence of alcohol. Relying
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on the supreme court's decision in Brown v. State,0 2 defendant argued
that the trial court should not have admitted the document because the
State did not prove the elements of the business records exception to the
rule against hearsay.30 3 The State argued that the document was selfauthenticating pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 40-6-392(f).30 On another
issue of first impression, the court of appeals considered whether section
40-6-392(f) conflicted with Brown.30 5
Section 40-6-392(f) provides that certificates of inspection of breathtesting equipment are "self-authenticating, [and] shall be admissible in
any court of law."30 ' In Brown the supreme court held that the
admission of a certificate of inspection of a breath test machine does not
violate the confrontation clauses of the Federal and State constitutions.30 7 The supreme court reasoned that the witness against a DUI
defendant is not the certificate of inspection, but rather the machine
itself.308 The certificate does not attest to a defendant's guilt; it only
addresses the performance and accuracy of the breath-testing machine.3 °9 In Jackson the court of appeals remarked that "[a] purely
foundational witness is unable to testify as to any element of the
charged offense and thus is not considered a witness 'against' a criminal
defendant for purposes of traditional Confrontation Clause analysis."310
However, the supreme court also held in Brown that the certificate of
inspection did not violate the Confrontation Clause because it was
admissible pursuant to the business records exception to the hearsay
rule."1 Generally, if an out-of-court statement falls within a firmly
rooted exception to the rule against hearsay, the introduction of that
statement into evidence does not violate the Confrontation Clause. 12
In Jackson defendant read Brown to require the State to prove the
elements of the business record exception to the hearsay rule. 3 If the
State failed to do so, defendant argued, then it had not proven that the
document fell within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule.31 4
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Thus, its admission would violate his rights under the Confrontation
Clause.3 15 The court of appeals disagreed.3 16 It read Brown to hold
simply that a certificate of inspection is admissible; although the
decision did not address the procedures for admission.317 More specifically, Brown did not address the self-authenticating provision of section
40-6-392(f). The court reasoned the document fell clearly within a
recognized hearsay exception and thus was admissible, assuming that
a proper foundation for the admission of the document had been
laid. 3 8 The court held this foundation was established by the selfConsequently, it was
authenticating language in section 40-6-392(f).'
not necessary for the state to lay a foundation for the admission of the
document
under the business records exception to the rule against
3 20
hearsay.

Advances in technology that increasingly give individuals and
businesses alternatives to "paper documents" potentially raise authenticity issues. During the survey period, the General Assembly amended the
Georgia Electronic Records and Signatures Act and made the Act more
specific and more comprehensive.3 2' The new law provides that
electronic records and signatures are not inadmissible as evidence simply
because they are electronic. 22 When a document is required by law
to be in writing or to be signed, an electronic record or signature
satisfies that requirement.323 If the law requires the signature or
record to be original, an electronic record or an electronic signature
satisfies that requirement.
However, the law also provides that the
Act does not "relieve any party to a legal proceeding from complying
with applicable rules of evidence requiring authentication or identification of a record or signature as a condition precedent to its admission
into evidence."325 Essentially, the Act seems to place electronic
documents on the same footing as written documents.
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The Best Evidence Rule

The best evidence rule can be difficult to apply. When is a party
seeking to prove the contents of a document, in which event the best
evidence rule requires the production of documents, and when is a party
seeking to prove a fact that only happens to be memorialized in a
document, in which event the best evidence rule does not apply? The
court of appeals addressed this issue in Jackson County Board of Health
v. Fugett Construction, Inc.326 In Jackson County a manufacturer of
on-site sewage management systems and a construction company sought
to mandamus the Jackson County Board of Health after it failed to
approve the installation of their septic tanks. The companies contended
that their septic tank system had received state approval pursuant to a
procedure established by O.C.G.A. section 31-2-7,27 which permits the
Georgia Department of Human Resources to grant statewide approval
of on-site sewage management systems. When the companies attempted
to adduce testimony that their septic tank system had received such
approval, the trial court sustained defendant's best evidence objection.
On appeal the companies argued that they were not attempting to prove
the contents of a document, but rather the fact of approval of the septic
tank systems. 8 ' The supreme court disagreed: "where questioning of
a witness refers to a document and seeks production of the contents of
that document, the best evidence rule is properly invoked."3 29 When
questioning the witness, plaintiff's counsel referred specifically to a
document entitled "Manual for Onsite Sewage Management Systems,"
and attempted to establish that defendant's system was listed in the
document.3 0 Under these circumstances, the court held, the trial
court properly sustained defendant's best evidence objection.33 '
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